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T

he concept of privacy developed
alongside the common law, but it also
has a philosophical background. It is
especially important for librarians, archivists,
publishers, and book distributors to understand
the concept of privacy, since behind all the
philosophical debates is the fact that privacy is
about the dissemination of information. And,
of course, that is the business we are all in. As
one author explained:
Privacy [law] attempts to draw a line
between the individual and the collective, between self and society. It seeks
to assure the individual a zone in which
to be an individual, not a member of the
community. In that zone he can think his
own thoughts, have his own secrets, live
his own life, reveal only what he wants
to the outside world.1
In the U.S. Constitution, privacy comes
first from the fourth and fifth Amendments,
later applied to the states by the fourteenth
Amendment. In the 20th century, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided a number of First
Amendment cases on the basis of privacy.
In the 19th century, however, the concept of
privacy was the purview of philosophers rather
than lawyers.2 The concept traces its roots back
to Aristotle’s “distinction between the public
sphere of political activity and the private
sphere associated with family and domestic
life.”3 As John Stuart Mill asked his readers
in the classic treatise On Liberty:
WHAT, then, is the rightful
limit to the sovereignty of
the individual over himself?
Where does the authority of
society begin? How much of
human life should be assigned
to individuality, and how much
to society? Each will receive
its proper share, if each has
that which more particularly
concerns it. To individuality
should belong the part of life
in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested;
to society, the part which
chiefly interests society.4
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The idea of privacy as a function of liberty
was an attempt to differentiate the home from
the society. As author Randall P. Bezanson
has noted:
The right to privacy thus represented
an effort to preserve communitarian
values and institutions. The right “to
be let alone” connoted protection of
the community from the masses, the
maintenance of a local reference point
for personal identity. It did not, as it
does today, convey an idea of extreme
individualism, of freedom “to” rather
than freedom “from.” It was not a protection against public embarrassment.
It was not even, at the time, a concept
principally designed to instill norms
of decency in the public press or the
public dialogue; that purpose arose later.
Rather, privacy reflected the fact that
personal identity developed in discrete
institutions such as the extended family
and the circle of friends and associates
that are perhaps best captured in the
term “local community.” The concept
of privacy represented an attempt to
protect the functioning of those discrete
social institutions from the monolithic,
impersonal, and value-free forces of
modern society by channeling [sic]
that which is personal to these discrete
institutions and foreclosing it to society
at large.5
It took the future Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis and his partner,
Samuel Warren, to define the legal
right to privacy in
a famous article in
the Harvard Law
Review. 6 Warren
and Brandeis were
concerned with the free
flow of information, and
felt that technological developments had made family life public.
They were especially upset over information and illustrations printed in
the newspaper about the wedding of
Warren’s daughter. The two lawyers

struggled to find a way to legally protect this
realm of privacy. According to the article:
That the individual shall have full
protection in person and in property is
a principle as old as the common law;
but it has been found necessary from
time to time to define anew the exact
nature and extent of such protection.
Political, social, and economic changes
entail the recognition of new rights, and
the common law, in its eternal youth,
grows to meet the demands of society.
. . . Gradually, the scope of these legal
rights broadened, and now the right to
life has come to mean the right to enjoy life — the right to be let alone; the
right to liberty secures the exercise of
extensive civil privileges; and the term
“property” has grown to compromise
every form of possession — intangible
as well as tangible. . . .
Recent inventions and business methods call attention to . . . the right “to be
let alone.” Instantaneous photographs
and newspaper enterprise have invaded
the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life, and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the
prediction that “what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the
housetops.”7
The Warren and Brandeis article was the
first attempt to define a legal privacy right. In
seeking to define a law of privacy, Warren
and Brandeis looked at the law of defamation. The issue of privacy is very similar to
defamation, since privacy seeks to restrict the
flow of information while defamation seeks
to punish false information. However, there
are also important differences. While defamation is concerned with damage to reputations,
false light invasion of privacy deals with the
plaintiff’s mental distress.8 Courts have decided that “false light invasion of privacy” is
often also defamation. In many cases, the two
theories are included as alternatives; however,
the plaintiff can only recover on one ground
for a single publication.9
continued on page 56
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Comparisons Between Privacy
and Defamation
When the privacy article was written in
1890, Brandeis was already showing flashes of
the genius that would make him the first Jewish
member of the U.S. Supreme Court. (Samuel
Warren was no slouch, either.) The two authors didn’t just advocate a right of privacy;
they actually tried to define its structure and
borders. The law partners articulated a series
of principles from defamation law that could
be applied to their proposed right of privacy.
The rules that Warren and Brandeis described
are as follows:
(1) The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is
of public or general interest.
This is both an acknowledgement of the
First Amendment and an attempt to create a
workable rule. An analogy from defamation
law would be the case of New York Times v.
Sullivan.10 In that case, Sullivan was the police commissioner of Montgomery, Alabama.
Sullivan was newsworthy because he was
a public figure. Thus, the Supreme Court
ruled that stories about Sullivan and the way
in which he runs the police department are of
general interest. As Warren and Brandeis
state:
The design of the law must be to protect
those persons with those affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from
being dragged into an undesirable and
undesired publicity and to protect all
persons . . . from having matters which
they may properly prefer to keep private,
made public against their will. It is the
unwarranted invasion of individual
privacy which is reprehended, and to
be, so far as possible, prevented. The
distinction, however, noted in the above
statement is obvious and fundamental.
There are persons who may reasonably
claim as a right, protection from the
notoriety entailed by being made the
victims of journalistic enterprise. There
are others who, in varying degrees,
have renounced the right to live their
lives screened from public observation.
Matters which men of the first class
may justly contend, concern themselves
alone, may in those of the second be the
subject of legitimate interest to their
fellow citizens. Peculiarities of manner and person, which in the ordinary
individual should be free from comment, may acquire a public importance,
if found in a candidate for political
office. Some further discrimination is
necessary, therefore, than to class facts
or deeds as public or private. . . . To
publish of a modest and retiring individual that he suffers from an impediment in his speech or that he cannot spell
correctly is an unwarranted, if not an
unexampled, infringement of his rights,
while to state and comment on the same
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characteristics found in a would-be
congressman could not be regarded as
beyond the pale of propriety.11
(2) The right to privacy does not prohibit the communication of any matter,
though in its nature private, when the
publication is made under circumstances which would render it a privileged
communication according to the law of
slander and libel.
This exception concerns statements made
in court, during the deliberation of a legislative
body, and similar types of situations.12 There
are times when a private matter is brought up in
a courtroom. Once that occurs, the matter is no
longer private, and becomes a matter of public
record. For example, allegations of adultery by
a person who is not a public figure shouldn’t be
put on the front page of the newspaper under
normal circumstances. However, they may be
revealed during divorce proceedings.
(3) The law would probably not grant
any redress for the invasion of privacy
by oral publication in the absence of
special damage.
In this situation, Warren and Brandeis are
talking about the 19th Century belief that the
words in print would last longer and be disseminated more widely than the spoken word.
With the technological advances in radio and
television, spoken words can be disseminated
as widely as print, and can last just as long.
This principle may not have stood the test of
time. Warren and Brandeis were also thinking about political speech issues, stating: “The
injury resulting from such oral communications would ordinarily be so trifling that the
law might well, in the interest of free speech,
disregard it altogether.”
(4) The right to privacy ceases upon
the publication of the facts by the individual, or with his consent.
This principle is based on a type of implied
consent. Naturally, if someone puts information into the public sphere, he or she can’t later
claim invasion of privacy (or defamation, for
that matter). Of course, if the information is
released for a restricted purpose, this does not
constitute a disclosure.
For example, medical records can’t be disclosed without permission. A physician can’t
tell a newspaper reporter that Joe Smith has
cancer. However, if Joe Smith writes an article
talking about having cancer, the newspaper can
report this later. After all, Joe Smith already
put the information into the public sphere. On
the other hand, just because Joe Smith tells his
family that he has cancer doesn’t mean that it
has become public knowledge, so the paper
can’t report on this illness. “[T]he important
principle in this connection [is] that a private
communication of circulation for a restricted
purpose is not a publication with the meaning
of the law.”13
(5) The truth of the matter published
does not afford a defense.
Warren and Brandeis stress that truth
should not be a defense, since: “It is not for injury to the individual’s character that redress or
prevention is sought, but for injury to the right

of privacy. For the former, the law of slander
and libel provides perhaps a sufficient safeguard. The latter implies the right not merely
to prevent inaccurate portrayal of private life,
but to prevent its being depicted at all.”14
(6) The absence of “malice” in the
publisher does not afford a defense.
According to Warren and Brandeis, it
shouldn’t matter whether the disclosure of
information was made with malice or whether
it was made in innocence. It is the disclosure of
information itself that they are concerned with,
not the reason for the disclosure. This principle
is borrowed from defamation law as well, since
proof of actual malice is only necessary if the
subject is a public figure. “The invasion of
the privacy that is to be protected is equally
complete and equally injurious, whether the
motive by which the speaker or writer was
actuated are, taken by themselves, culpable
or not; just as the damage to character, and, to
some extent, the tendency to provoke a breach
of the peace, is equally the result of defamation without regard to the motives leading to
its publication.”15
It is amazing how much of the law of privacy comes from this article by Warren and
Brandeis. Although somewhat dated (the
belief that oral communications didn’t matter
has been surpassed by technology), most of the
principles articulated by these two authors are
still a part of the law of privacy. The article
recommended that the remedies for invasion
of privacy be an action for damages or an
injunction.16 These are still the remedies that
are used. Warren and Brandeis set the framework for our right of privacy, and we are still
following this framework more than a century
later. Everything that came later was simply a
refinement. Yet there have been a few changes
in our conception of privacy law. As Randall
P. Bezanson has noted:
[P]rivacy in 1890 was focused principally on apprehension about disclosure
of personal affairs in the public forum,
particularly in the relatively new mass
media. In 1890, information was tightly
and almost exclusively controlled by a
very few large institutions. As the dominant institution, the press was viewed
with apprehension by the individual. It
threatened loss of identity or, perhaps
more accurately, it threatened to shift
the source of identity by making identity into a social construct rather than a
choice governed by oneself and one’s
intimate associations. In the 1990s,
control of information — both access
to it and the power of its dissemination
— is much more widely dispersed. Information generally still is the province
of institutions, but many more institutions possess personal information, and
the prospect of even more decentralized
control over information looms large.
There is little likelihood that the mechanisms that earlier served as gatekeepers
on information are an effective limit on
disclosure today. The comfort, if that is
an apt description, of a large but limited
continued on page 57
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threat has been removed. Indeed, part
of the concern about privacy today is
the seemingly unlimited potential for
disclosure from multiple sources for
multiple, and unknown, uses. Disclosure of information in the public press
seems hardly the bulk of the privacy
problem today, although it is surely the
most widely noted.17
The 20th Century court cases involving privacy have tended towards a finding of privacy
as a First Amendment right to receive information, including (with great controversy) the
case of Griswold v. Connecticut.18 This record
was reviewed by the Hawaii Attorney General
in a discussion of library privacy:19
The First Amendment “necessarily protects the right to receive” information.
It protects the anonymity of the author;
the anonymity of members of organizations; the right to ask persons to join a
labor organization without registering
to do so; the right to dispense and to
receive birth control information in private; the right to have controversial mail
delivered without written request; the
right to go to a meeting without being
questioned as to whether you attended
or what you said; the right to give a
lecture without being compelled to tell
the government what you said; and the
right to view a pornographic film in
the privacy of your own home without
governmental intrusion.
If by virtue of the First and Fourteenth
Amendment, “a state has no business telling a
man, sitting alone in his own house, what books
he may read or what films he may watch,” then
neither does the state have any business telling
a man’s neighbor what book or picture he has
checked out of the public library to read or view
in the privacy of his own home.20
On the other hand, the First Amendment
also provides a counter-balance to the idea of
privacy in certain situations. For example, the
“public figure” test in the case of New York
Times v. Sullivan21 points in the other direction.
Also, the guarantee of freedom of the press can
be in conflict with privacy. These factors make
privacy cases very difficult to decide. “While
almost everyone favors privacy in the abstract,
conflict always arises over the particulars. Like
obscenity, most people agree there is a line
beyond which conduct is unacceptable: but
where is it? Who is to draw the line? How
will it be drawn? Specificity is particularly
important in understanding whether informational privacy is something that we have and
must protect or is something to be gained.”22
As Michael Grossberg has observed, “[I]t
is impossible to escape these definitional issues. . . . Privacy is in many ways a matter
of shared expectations and sensibilities; thus,
controversy over its meaning has always been
linked to clashing normative concerns about
the flow of information and the social occasion,
purpose, timing, and status of those gathering
and using information.”23
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The American Economic
Association Announces
New Journals!
Four New Journals in 2009!
The AEA is launching four new
peer - reviewed field journals:
• The American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
will focus on empirical micro issues.
• The American Economic Journal: Economic Policy
will examine the role of economic policy in economic
outcomes.
• The American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
will feature studies of economic fluctuations and growth.
• The American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
will accept articles on microeconomic theory, industrial
organization, and aspects of international trade,
political economy, and finance.

Like the American Economic Review, the
Journal of Economic Literature, and the
Journal of Economic Perspectives, the
new journals will be available in print
and online. The AEA also publishes
EconLit.

American Economic Association • www.aeaweb.org • info@econlit.org
2403 Sidney Street, Suite 260 • Pittsburgh, PA 15203 • PH: 412-432-2301 • FAX: 412-431-3014

The biggest problem with defining the
limits of privacy comes in the idea that a
democracy works best when information is
made known to the people. For example,
privacy concerns are a powerful reason for
the denial of a FOIA request or for redaction
of names and addresses. We also want our
medical records available for emergencies,
but protected the rest of the time. Security is
another area where the dichotomy between
the private and the public sphere has broken
down.24 Yet for all its difficulties, privacy has
become a piece of our liberty, and the right of
privacy is here to stay.

The work of Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis made history when it was published. A whole body of law sprang up
overnight, with most of its principles already
established. While we have made refinements to the law of privacy in the past 128
years, most of what we know today as the
law of privacy came from the pen of these
two great legal minds. It is only fitting that
we pay tribute to the unexpectedly large influence that one article by two law partners
has had on our lives.
endnotes on page 58
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